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Raimundas Matulevičius • Alex Norta • Silver Samarütel
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Abstract Security risk management is an important part of
system development. Given that a majority of modern
organizations rely heavily on information systems, security
plays a big part in ensuring smooth operations of business
processes. For example, many people rely on e-services
offered by banks and medical establishments. Inadequate
security measures in information systems have unwanted
effects on an organization’s reputation and on people’s
lives. This case study paper targets the secure system
development problem by suggesting the application of
security requirements elicitation from business processes
(SREBP). This approach provides business analysts with
means to elicit and introduce security requirements to
business processes through the application of the security
risk-oriented patterns (SRPs). These patterns help find
security risk occurrences in business processes and present
mitigations for these risks. At the same time, they reduce
the efforts needed for risk analysis. In this paper, the
authors report their experience to derive security require-
ments for mitigating security risks in the distributed airline
turnaround systems.
Keywords Security risk management  Security patterns 
Security requirements engineering  Airline turnaround
process
1 Introduction
Security is a very important quality which enables software
to protect information and information systems from unau-
thorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or
destruction (Anderson 2008). Modern organizations rely
heavily on information systems, and security is essential for
ensuring smooth operations of business processes. For
example, airline industry with its rich socio-technical
structure has experienced a quick and comprehensive
adoption of information technology (Belobaba et al. 2015).
A socio-technical system is a complex organizational work
design where people solve problems at their workplaces
with the means of sophisticated technology. In this complex
environment one needs to consider arising security risks and
define their countermeasures; in case of the aviation domain
an underestimation of its complexity might lead to catas-
trophic airline crashes in the worst scenarios.
In this paper we apply the case study method (Runeson
et al. 2012) and analyze the secure system development
problem by applying an approach for security requirements
elicitation from business processes (SREBP) (Ahmed
2014; Ahmed and Matulevičius 2015; Sandkuhl et al.
2015). In this extended version [the conference paper was
published in Samarütel et al. (2016)], the objective is to
elicit security requirements from the airline turnaround
processes and, by highlighting the security risks, to show
why these requirements are important.
As to the context of the research objective, communi-
cation is another critical security issue, an example being
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the deliberate jamming of automatic dependent surveil-
lance-broadcast (ADS-B) systems (Leonardi et al. 2014), a
surveillance technology to determine an aircraft position.
Furthermore, we are coming to realize that the aviation
industry is rapidly turning into a cyber-physical system
(CPS) (Sampigethaya and Poovendran 2013) that poses
additional novel risks and security issues. Briefly, a CPS
(Bartelt et al. 2015) is a system composed of physical
entities that are controlled or monitored by computer-based
algorithms. The initial approach to studying airport-related
security was rather technical while recent work recognizes
this as a socio-technical system (Long 2013).
In Maiden et al. (2008), the authors recognize the socio-
technical nature of airports by employing use cases and sto-
ryboards to discover stakeholder requirements such as secu-
rity for the development of an airport operating system.
Furthermore, in Massacci et al. (2014) the authors investigate
the evolution of requirements in the context of the Secur-
eChange1 EU-project by means of an industry case from the
Air Traffic Management (ATM) domain. Safety- and security
experts are part of the focus groups while the case study
results do not highlight the security specifics. Parameter
measurability and social aspects of security policies in Shim
et al. (2014) investigate the costs versus benefit trade-offs in
alternative airport security policy constellations pertaining to,
e.g., passengers or items such as baggage.
Literature shows that security-focused research for airline
management is a topical area of interest. However, the topics
under investigation are very specific and do not acknowl-
edge that modern technology enables ad-hoc and process-
aware collaborations (Kutvonen et al. 2012; Norta et al.
2014, 2015) which significantly reduce the amount of time
and costs of airline management while yielding simultane-
ous improvements in service quality. Such novel ways of
airline management systems also lead to unusual security
risk issues for which the mitigation strategies are unclear.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
comprises work related to this paper. Section 3 presents the
case under investigation which is about a cross-organiza-
tional airline turnaround process. Section 4 presents the
results of the investigation and is followed by a discussion
in Sect. 5. Finally, Sect. 6 concludes the paper and provides
directions for future work.
2 Related Work
The background literature comprises two parts, namely a
first part dealing with earlier studies and a second part
dealing with relevant theory. For the first part about earlier
studies, Sect. 2.1 introduces the method for security
requirements elicitation from business processes (SREBP).
Section 2.2 focuses on a set of security risk-oriented pat-
terns and their applications, and Sect. 2.3 gives a detailed
example for such a security pattern. For the second part
about relevant theory, Sect. 2.4 presents means for securing
business processes. Next, Sect. 2.5 discusses the elicitation
and engineering of security requirements. Finally, Sect. 2.6
gives previous SREBP applications.
2.1 Security Requirements Elicitation from Business
Processes
The main goal of the SREBP approach is to identify
enterprise assets, to determine related security objectives,
and to elicit security requirements in order to discuss and to
ensure security during business-process execution (Ahmed
2014; Ahmed and Matulevičius 2015; Sandkuhl et al.
2015). Based on the guidance of the ISSRM domain model
(Mayer 2009; Dubois et al. 2010), the approach integrates
security into processes to enable business analysts to
understand and derive the security requirements from the
business-process models.
The SREBP process consists of two stages (see Fig. 1).
The first stage identifies business assets and determines
security objectives. It is based on the analysis of the
business process models described at the different levels of
abstractions, for example business value chain and business
process diagrams. Specifically, the business process dia-
gram expands separate actions represented in the value
chain diagram. These diagrams describe the use of data
objects, data flows and data storages (see, for example,
Fig. 6). The protected business assets, typically, are elicited
from the value chain and a security objective is determined
for each identified business asset.
The second stage comprises as main activities (1) the
identification of patterns, (2) an extraction of a security
model based on pattern occurrences, and (3) a derivation of
security requirements. A security risk-oriented pattern
Fig. 1 The SREBP process. Adapted from Sandkuhl et al. (2015)
1 http://www.securechange.eu/.
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(SRP) is an artifact for guiding the derivation of security
risk requirements from business process diagrams. The
patterns describe recurring security risks that arise within
business processes. To mitigate the risks, the patterns
recommend security requirements. When applying SRPs,
pattern occurrences (i.e., a specific security context of
SRP, see example in Sect. 2.3) are found in the business
process diagrams. Pattern occurrences result in a security
model that is extracted from the business process diagram
based on the used SRP. Security requirements are derived
from the security model.
2.2 Security Risk-Oriented Patterns
SRPs play an important role in the SREBP application. ‘‘A
security pattern describes a particular recurring security
problem that arises in a specific security context and pre-
sents a well-proven generic scheme for a security solution’’
(Schumacher et al. 2005). Based on the definition above
and following the domain model for security risk man-
agement (Mayer 2009; Dubois et al. 2010), a set of security
risk oriented patterns (SRPs) is suggested in Ahmed (2014)
and Ahmed and Matulevičius (2014, 2015). Hence, each
SRP comprises a specific security context expressed by
means of asset-related concepts, as well as recurring
security problems that are analyzed in terms of security risk
related concepts, and suggests security countermeasures
that are presented with security risk treatment concepts.
Below follows a short introduction of each SRP:
– SRP1: secures data from unauthorized access. The
security criteria is confidentiality of the data used in a
business server. A user may request sensitive data from
a server with the intention of misuse. To reduce the
risk, the pattern proposes checking access rights.
Sensitivity levels must be assigned to data- and trust
levels – to people or devices accessing these data.
– SRP2: ensures secure data transmission between
business entities. Data confidentiality and integrity are
two important security criteria. However, during data
transmission through a transmission medium, an inter-
ception by an attacker is possible. Thus, data could be
stolen, read, changed, and (corrupted data) transmitted
to the third party. In order to reduce these risks, the
pattern recommends to make data unreadable and to
verify data once they are received by a destination
party.
– SRP3: ensures secure business activity after data
submission. The security criteria for this pattern are
availability and integrity of the business activity.
Malicious scripts (e.g. SQL-, or xPath injections)
submitted by means of an input interface may lead to
the disruption of a business activity, rendering the latter
unavailable and making it lose its integrity. Further-
more, the pattern proposes to filter incoming data, e.g.,
in the form of input validation, sanitation, filtration and/
or canonicalization.
– SRP4: secures business services against distributed
denial of service (DDoS) attacks. The security criterion
is the availability of a business service. The risk is that
a threat agent exists who creates bots of computers and
sends simultaneous requests (e.g., DNS flooding, HTTP
spidering, etc.) to the target server. To reduce the risk,
the pattern proposes a security requirement check (i.e.,
filtering, classifying and detecting) for abnormal
requests.
– SRP5: secures storage of data and data retrieval from
storage. The security criterion for this pattern is
confidentiality of data in the storage. The data might
leak horizontally across organizational departments. A
threat agent is a malicious insider with access to data in
a storage. Risk reduction may involve making data
invisible, or using storage monitoring and controlling.
In Sect. 2.3 we illustrate the SRP2 pattern, since it is used
to show how the airline-turnaround processes are examined
to determine the risks and to introduce security
countermeasures.
2.3 SRP2: Ensuring Data Transmission Between
Business Entities
This pattern addresses the electronic transmission of data
between two entities (Ahmed and Matulevičius
2014, 2015), as illustrated in Fig. 2. The scenario indicates
how the client fills in a form and submits data through the
Fig. 2 SRP2: asset modeling. Adapted from Ahmed and Mat-
ulevičius (2014)
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Input interface to the Server for data employment. Here,
the confidentiality and integrity of data are two important
security criteria.
We assume that the data are transmitted using a
transmissionmedium (see Fig. 3). However, this situation
faces (at least) two vulnerabilities. First, such a transmis-
sion medium could be intercepted by an attacker who acts
as a proxy. Second, since data are not encrypted, misuse is
possible, e.g., modification and passing to the server. This
event harms the data, leads to the loss of transmission
medium reliability, negates data integrity when data are
transmitted to the server, and negates confidentiality when
they are kept by the attacker.
Potential risk treatment includes risk reduction by
making data unreadable and verifying the received data
(see Fig. 4). The implementation includes the introduction
and application of a crypto- and a checksum algorithm.
2.4 Securing Business Process
Literature suggests several approaches to enforce security
on business processes. For example, Rodriguez et al. pro-
pose extensions to modeling secure business processes
through understanding the security requirements
(Rodriguez et al. 2007). Authors introduce non-reputation,
detection of harm caused by attack, integrity, privacy,
access control, security role, and security permission con-
structs. In Mülle et al. (2011), the security units are rep-
resented as structured text annotations tied to a particular
set of the BPMN constructs (e.g., tasks, lanes, and message
flows) which are equipped with the structured text anno-
tations. The authors suggest a method to enforce the
security requirements (e.g., access control, separation of
duty, binding of duty and need to know principles) during
the process runtime (Brucker et al. 2012).
Menzel et al. (2009) have proposed annotating the
business process models with security intentions and rat-
ings. The authors also define how to enable trustworthy
interactions, organizational trust, and security intensions.
The study (Schleicher et al. 2010) presents a method to
impose the compliance constraints on the business pro-
cesses. A concept of compliance scope is used to restrict
certain areas of a business process. This helps avoiding the
changes that would result in a non-compliant process.
Cherdantseva et al. (2012) study how business process
modeling language could be enriched with information
assurance and security modeling capabilities. This happens
by mapping the language constructs to the concepts of
Fig. 3 SRP2: risk modeling.
Adapted from Ahmed and
Matulevičius (2014)
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information assurance and security domain model. Simi-
larly, in Altuhhova et al. (2013) the business process model
and notation are aligned to the ISSRM domain model to
support security risks management in business processes.
We make use of the latter extensions both to introduce
SRPs in the business processes and to analyze the airline
turnaround processes.
2.5 Security Requirements Elicitation and Engineering
In Fabian et al. (2010), the authors present a conceptual
framework to compare and evaluate security requirements
engineering approaches. Elsewhere, in Mellado et al.
(2010), a systematic review is performed to classify secu-
rity related approaches for techniques, frameworks, pro-
cesses and methods. In this section we present a few
approaches related to the SREBP in terms of the goal to
elicit security requirements for the analyzed software sys-
tem. For instance, in Mellado et al. (2007, 2008), the
authors propose a security requirements engineering pro-
cess (SREP). The approach integrates several security
analysis and modeling techniques, such as common criteria
(CC 2015), UMLsec (Jürjens 2005), misuse cases (Sindre
and Opdahl 2005), and other.
The security quality requirements engineering
(SQUARE) method (Mead and Stehney 2005; Mead et al.
2005) consists of nine steps and facilitates the use of dif-
ferent techniques for artifact development, risk manage-
ment and assessment, security requirements elicitation and
filtering. The goal for the first step is to agree on the def-
initions for a process. The second step is to decide upon the
initial security goals. Step three involves developing, or
collecting artefacts of the system being worked on. Misuse
of these artefacts can be defined in misuse diagrams, goals,
attack trees and other relevant models. They are important
because security requirements elicitation is based on them.
The fourth step is a risk assessment that consists of an
assessment of the vulnerabilities and a classification of
threats. The fifth step covers the selection of the security
elicitation techniques. During step six, developers derive
security requirements based on the outcome of previous
steps. Next, two steps include security requirements cate-
gorization and prioritization. The last step is security
requirements inspection. The requirements that result from
earlier SQUARE steps are scrutinized to ensure that each
requirement is valid and verifiable. Each of the require-
ments must be financially feasible for implementation.
An extension of Tropos towards security is suggested in
Giorgini et al. (2005a, b) where the authors refine depen-
dencies between actors with the concepts and visual con-
structs of trust, delegation, provisioning, and ownership.
The ownership shows how the service owners access and
dispose of this service. Provisioning describes who is
allowed to provide the service. The delegation character-
izes a formal transmission of authority by some service,
e.g., from the owner to the provider. In addition authors
differentiate between trust in managing permissions and
trust in managing executions. Recently, this approach has
been extended for socio-technical system development
(Dalpiaz et al. 2016).
The mentioned security requirements elicitation and
engineering approaches suggest means to elicit, document,
analyze and manage security requirements. Still, they apply
different techniques than suggested in the SREBP and
potentially the approaches must be combined for achieving
improved results.
Fig. 4 SRP2: risk treatment modeling. Adapted from Ahmed and Matulevičius (2014)
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2.6 Previous SREBP Applications
In Ahmed and Matulevičius (2015), the SREBP approach
is applied in a laboratory information system and in a
football federation system. The performance of the SREBP
is compared to the SQUARE. In both cases it is observed
that SREBP contributes with the more complete set of
security requirements and, because of the predefined set of
the security risk-oriented patterns, the performance of
requirements derivation activities is faster. At the same
time, earlier case studies do not consider distributed sys-
tems. Therefore, in this paper we focus on the SREBP
approach to elicit security requirements from a distributed
airline turnaround system.
3 Case Study Design
The structure of this section is as follows. First, the
research questions are presented in Sect. 3.1. Next, we
describe the case selection in Sect. 3.2 followed by the
data-collection procedure of Sect. 3.3, the analysis- and
validation procedure in Sect. 3.4.
3.1 Research Questions
For this case study, we derive the main research question of
how to apply SREBP for early stage security analysis in the
airline turnaround domain from the earlier stated research
objectives in the introduction. To establish a separation of
concerns, the main research question is split into the set of
sub-questions below:
– RQ1: What are the protected assets in the airline
turnaround processes?
– RQ2: What are security countermeasures for the airline
turnaround processes?
– RQ3: What are the related security risks?
3.2 Case Selection
To answer these questions we illustrate the application of
SREBP in the aviation-turnaround system that Nõukas
(2015) first investigated and that was further explored in
Matulevičius et al. (2016). The airline-turnaround process
in Fig. 5 depicts three swimlanes for ground services,
passenger management and gate agent respectively. The
ground-services swimlane begins with a start-signal event
to commence after-flight services. The following top par-
allel branch of the AND-split comprises a catching inter-
mediary start signal event for all passengers being de-
boarded, followed by yet another AND-split for cleaning,
restocking the aircraft, and fueling after a start message
event indicates a fuel-slip receipt. The restocking task for
the aircraft requires a passenger-information data object,
e.g., comprising dietary needs. Following the AND-join, an
intermediate signal event signals boarding is allowed.
The other branch of the initial AND-split commences
with a cargo- and luggage offloading task, followed by an
AND-split with respective intermediate message event
nodes. The top parallel branch halts until it receives a
message from an adjacent process indicating a cargo
assignment and the second parallel branch likewise needs
to wait until catching the message that the luggage receipt
exists. After this the AND-join, cargo- and luggage-loading
starts, culminating into another AND-join before an end-
signal event terminates the process for ground services.
The middle passenger-management swimlane of Fig. 5
begins with a start timer event 24 h before the estimated
time of departure (ETD). The latter follows an AND-split
with the top parallel branch starting a sequence with a
passenger check-in task which receives a data object with
external passenger information. The task also contributes to
a data object about checked-in passengers. Next, an inter-
mediate timer event waits for 4 h before ETD for luggage
check-in commences. The luggage check-in task requires
the data object about checked-in passengers and produces a
luggage-data object. After the completed check-in and with
1 h left until ETD, an intermediate message event sends
information about the luggage being ready to the swimlane
for ground services before the AND-join. The bottom
parallel branch starts after-flight services with an interme-
diate signal event, followed by a passenger de-boarding
task from the landed airplane. An intermediate signal event
indicates all passengers are deplaned, followed by yet
another intermediate signal event to say that boarding may
proceed. The subsequent boarding-process task involves
the data object for boarded passenger information with the
final AND-join leading to the end signal event for signing
off the preflight service.
The final gate-agent swimlane in Fig. 5 comprises a start
signal event for the aircraft’s arrival, followed by an
intermediate signal event to start after-flight services. The
gate agent monitors the turnaround process before an
AND-split where in parallel two intermediate signal events
indicate a preflight service sign-off for ground operation
and for passenger management respectively. The following
AND-join culminates in the end signal event for allowing
an airplane takeoff.
3.3 Data-Collection Procedure
The airline turnaround case in Fig. 5 results from industry
collaboration with an ICT-service providing company from
the aviation domain. In an initial meeting with the com-
pany, the case context was presented that formerly low-
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tech airline-turnaround processes involving several small-
and medium-sized enterprises (SME) are now significantly
ICT supported and virtually integrated. Consequently, the
challenges occur for aligning cross-organizationally the
respective processes into an overall streamlined aviation
turnaround that is additionally secured against attacks.
Given the novel and challenging context of having to
align cross-organizational business-processes with a high
degree of automation and the requirement of securing the
resulting aviation turnaround, the data-collection happened
on site with the company and its clients at a very large
European airport. Over a month, workshops were con-
ducted abroad with several employees of the aviation
company and its clients in which the processes and related
assets were studied and captured in models with docu-
mentation (Nõukas 2015).
After studying the turnaround processes, the aviation
company initiated a follow-up project in which the focus
was to study security risks and their mitigations
(Matulevičius et al. 2016). Again, employees of the avia-
tion company were interviewed over several months to
collect data about security risks for the turnaround case in
Fig. 5. This security-related data collection also involved
interviews with customers of the aviation company.
3.4 Analysis- and Validation Procedures
As discussed in Jürjens (2005), while developing secure
systems, the security engineering focus is placed on system
implementation and maintenance. However, since security
risk mitigation yields changes to a specification, a security
analysis is important at an early phase (i.e., business-pro-
cess- and requirement analysis). The benefit is the pre-
vention of expensive design changes later in the
development. In this paper, we shift the focus to the early
stage of security analysis where the business processes are
first captured in a conceptual and technology independent
way.
Fig. 5 Airline turnaround
process. Adapted from Nõukas
(2015)
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We apply the SREBP to the airline turnaround pro-
cesses, reported in Nõukas (2015). The analysis scope
includes five processes: (1) passenger check-in, (2) bag-
gage check-in, (3) fuel service form issuing, (4) fuel ser-
vice form requesting, and (5) loading instruction form
requesting. The investigation comprises five steps:
1. Introducing system support The original turnaround
processes, described by Nõukas (2015), include rather
limited details on how the processes themselves are
carried out and how they are supported by information
technology systems. Hence this model presents the
major value flow in the process and, thus, it can be
used to understand the business assets and the security
needs. However, to perform security requirements
elicitation (using, e.g., SREBP), it is important to
introduce how the system supports the major data
exchange and data usage. The result of introducing
system support is a set of models (e.g., like the one
presented in Fig. 6) pertaining to the turnaround
processes supported by the system.
2. Validating models with the system expert We have
invited an expert who is knowledgeable in airline-
turnaround processes to validate the developed system
support process models (Samarütel 2016). The out-
come of this step is a set of expert-validated models of
the turnaround processes with corresponding system
support.
3. Deriving security requirements using SREBP In this
step we apply the SREBP to understand the security
risks, to derive requirements and to introduce these
security requirements to the analyzed processes (Sa-
marütel 2016). The outcome of this step is the
turnaround-process models enhanced with security
requirements (see, e.g., Fig. 11).
4. Performing the trade-off analysis of elicited risks and
security countermeasures The performed trade-off
analysis is based on the gathered metrics for the
security risk reduction, requirements cost and asset
value.
5. Validating the turnaround models enhanced with
security requirements The received process models
are validated by the knowledgeable expert both for the
turnaround processes and for security (Samarütel
2016). The outcome of this step is the validated
turnaround-process models enhanced with security
requirements.
For an extensive report about the above steps, we refer the
reader to Samarütel (2016). In the next section, we report
on the results of the case study steps.
4 Results
In this section, we illustrate the application of the SREBP
approach to understand security requirements in the airline
turnaround processes. We focus on the Passenger check-in
process that is a part of the overall value-chain process
(Nõukas 2015; Matulevičius et al. 2016) (see also Fig. 5).
Fig. 6 Passenger check-in
process
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By analysing the Passenger check-in, we answer the
research questions from Sect. 3.1 while focusing on the
application and usage of SRP2 and also shortly discussing
the use of other patterns.
The remainder of this sections is structured as follows.
Section 4.1 identifies business assets and determines
security objectives. In Sect. 4.2, we use SRPs to elicit
security requirements, and in Sect. 4.3 we show how pat-
terns are used to provide the rationale for the security
requirements, i.e., to visualize security risks mitigation.
Finally, Sect. 4.4 reports about the application of SREBP to
other turnaround processes.
4.1 Business Asset Identification and Security
Objective Determination
In this section we give the answer to the first research
question:
– RQ1: What are the protected assets in the airline
turnaround processes?
Business-asset and security-objective identification is the
first stage of the SREBP process (see Sect. 2) and com-
prises two steps: (1) identification of the business assets
and (2) determination of security objectives. The key data
used in the Passenger check-in process are related to the
passenger’s personal information and boarding pass. We
assume that there exists a generic object that describes
Passenger Check-in details together with attributes such as
Passenger info, Passenger boarding pass, which requires
protection during process execution. The following secu-
rity objective comprises three security criteria and is
defined as follows: (1) integrity of the passenger check-in
details, (2) confidentiality of the passenger check-in details,
and (3) availability of the passenger check-in details. This
security objective is a compound element consisting of the
confidentiality, integrity and availability criteria applied to
the attributes of the Passenger Check-in details, such as
Passenger info and Passenger boarding pass, and so on.
Before approaching the second research question, it is
important to understand the business process diagram for
the Passenger check-in process2 in Fig. 6. Once the
passenger initializes the process, he enters the booking
number and fills in the required information (see
Fill in required information), e.g., preferred seat, meal
options, etc. Then the Passenger info is sent to the
Check in server. At the Check in server the booking
number is checked (see Check booking number). If the
latter is not correct, the Passenger is requested to correct
the check-in details (see
Request correct booking number). Otherwise, the
Passenger info is stored in the Data store. Next, the
Boarding pass is issued (see Issue boarding pass) and
sent (see Send boarding pass) to the Passenger. Once
the Passenger receives the Boarding pass, the check-in
process is completed.
4.2 Security Requirement Elicitation
Security requirement elicitation is the second step of the
SREBP (see Sect. 2). By illustrating this stage we answer
the second research question:
– RQ2: What are security countermeasures for the airline
turnaround processes?
This stage includes the application of the SRPs to derive
security requirements. Patterns are applied iteratively by
conducting three steps: (1) identify pattern, (2) extract
security model, and (3) derive security requirements.
Additionally, each SRP has its own respective process for
extracting a related security model as discussed in Ahmed
and Matulevičius (2015). The summary of derived security
requirements (and potential controls that implement these
requirements) is given in Table 1. Below we illustrate how
SRPs are applied. A detailed application of these patterns
in the airline turnaround processes is discussed in Samar-
ütel (2016).
4.2.1 Application of SRP1
Identify pattern No occurrences of pattern SRP1 were
found in the PassengerCheck in process.
4.2.2 Application of SRP2
Identify pattern The SRP2 application derives security
requirements from the check-in process and also introduces
measures for securing the process. We identify three pattern
occurrences: (1) when Passenger info is sent from
Passenger to Check in server; (2) when
Check in server requests a Passenger to deliver the
correct booking number; and (3) when the Boarding pass
is sent from the Check in server to a Passenger. Below
are detailed explanations for the first and third occurrences.
Extract security model To extract a security model
regarding the SRP2 pattern, one needs to identify com-
municators and transmitted data. Regarding the first SRP2
occurrence, the extracted security model is presented in
Fig. 7 where Passenger is identified as the client com-
municator and Check in server is defined as the server
communicator. Beforehand, Passenger info is sent while
the Check in server needs to establish secure commu-
nication details. Once the communication is established, it
2 Captured using check-in process description, such as: https://www.
airbaltic.com/en/online check in conditions.
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is not necessary re-establish it for every data item (in other
terms pattern occurrence). Thus, other data such as a
request to correct booking number, boarding pass, check-
sum, etc., can be communicated using the established
channel.
Derive security requirements After defining the security
model follows the introduction of security requirements to
mitigate the security risks. Figure 8 shows the security
requirements to mitigate security risks identified by the first
SRP2 occurrence:
– M1:SRP2a:1: a Passenger must make
Passenger info unreadable to the attacker before
sending it to the Communication channel.
– M1:SRP2a:2: the Check in server must make
passenger info readable once it is received from the
Communication channel.
– M1:SRP2b:1: a Passenger must calculate a check-
sum of the passenger info.
– M1:SRP2b:2: the Check in server must verify the
integrity of the passenger info once received from the
Communication channel.
Similar security requirements must be derived regarding
the Boarding pass, as Fig. 11 shows in detail:
– M1:SRP2a:3: the Check in server must make the
boarding pass unreadable for an attacker before
sending it to the Communication channel.
– M1:SRP2a:4: the Passenger must make the
boarding pass readable once received from the
Communication channel.
– M1:SRP2b:3: a Check in server must calculate a
checksum of the boarding pass.
– M1:SRP2b:4: the Passenger must verify the integrity
of the boarding pass when received from the
Communication channel.
Security requirements M1:SRP2a:1 4 are implemented
using the cryptography algorithms; for example, see
cryptographic key management pattern in Schumacher
et al. (2005). Requirements M1:SRP2b:1 and
M1:SRP2b:2 are implemented using the checksum
algorithms.
Table 1 Security requirements and controls for the Passenger check-in process
Req. ID Security requirements Controls
M1:SRP2a:1 Passsenger must make passenger info unreadable for attacker before
sending it to the Communication channel
Encryption algorithm
M1:SRP2a:2 Check in server must make passenger info readable once received from
the Communication channel
Encryption algorithm
M1:SRP2a:3 Check in server must make boardingpass unreadable for attacker
before sending it to the Communication channel
Encryption algorithm
M1:SRP2a:4 Passenger must make boarding pass readable once received from the
Communication channel
Encryption algorithm
M1:SRP2b:1 Passenger must calculate checksum of passenger info Checksum algorithm
M1:SRP2b:2 Check in server must verify integrity of passenger info once received
from the Communication channel
Checksum algorithm
M1:SRP2b:3 Check in server must calculate checksum of boarding pass Checksum algorithm
M1:SRP2b:4 Passenger must verify integrity of boarding pass when received from the
Communication channel
Checksum algorithm
M1:Req3a:1 Check booking number at Check in server must filter Passenger info
when received from the communication channel
Filter input for special characters and keywords,
use whitelist of acceptable inputs
M1:Req3b:1 Check booking number at Check in server must filter confidential
information from error messages and standard responses
Disable debug messages, use default error
messages or error pages
M1:Req4a:1 Check in server must filter for abnormal requests Firewall, DoS Defence System
M1:Req5a:1 Monitor the Data store at Check in server for malicious changes Data access control (or Control of database
signature changes)
M1:Req5b:1 Check in server should make passenger info invisible before storing in
the Data store
Encryption algorithm
Fig. 7 SRP2: extracted security model
123
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4.2.3 Application of SRP3
Identify pattern We identify one SRP3 occurrence: this is
when Passenger info is sent from Passenger to
Check in server. Two other instances of communica-
tions (i.e., when a request to correct boarding number is
sent from Check in server to Passenger and when a
boarding pass is sent from Check in server to
Passenger) between the Check in server and
Passenger are not relevant because the SRP3 is applied
for the input interfaces.
Extract security model There is no graphical security
model associated with SRP3. However, it is essential to
determine the input interface (i.e.,
Check booking number at Check in server) and the
input data, i.e., Passenger info and any other data (e.g.,
checksum as illustrated in SRP2) submitted to the
Check booking number at Check in server.
Derive security requirements Once security-related
information is defined, the following security requirements
are formulated:
– M1:Req3a:1: Check booking number at
Check in server must filter Passenger info when
received from the communication channel.
– M1:Req3b:1: Check booking number at
Check in server must filter confidential information
from error messages and standard responses.
To strengthen these requirements and their countermeasures
(Ahmed and Matulevičius 2014), security requirements for
Passenger info sanitization and canonicalization (Balzar-
otti et al. 2008; Clarke et al. 2012) could be defined.
4.2.4 Application of SRP4
Identify pattern Similar to SRP3, we identify one SRP4
occurrence: when Passenger info is sent from Passenger
to Check in server.
Extract security model In order to construct a security
model, one needs to identify the functional unit, i.e., the
Check booking number at the Check in server, and to
identify the business partner, i.e., Passenger. The security
model is instantiated following the network architecture
model, as illustrated in Fig. 9.
Derive security requirements The following security
requirement could be defined:
– M1:Req4a:1: Check in server must filter for abnor-
mal requests.
This ‘‘high level’’ requirement could be implemented by
installing, for example, firewalls or DoS defence systems
Fig. 8 Derivation of security requirements using SRP2
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(e.g., see Fig. 9). More specifically, the concrete security
requirements should be derived from the security model:
– M1:Req4a:1:1: Check in server should block all
the default incoming ports that can accept messages
until ports are not explicitly opened.
– M1:Req4a:1:2: Check in server should establish a
RuleBase (i.e., constraints) to communicate with the
Passenger (and other business partners).
– M1:Req4a:1:3: Packet filter firewall should filter the
Passenger’s address to determine if it is not a host
used by the threat agent.
– M1:Req4a:1:4: Proxy based firewall should commu-
nicate to the proxy that represents the
Check booking number to determine the validity of
the request received from the Passenger.
– M1:Req4a:1:5: State firewall should maintain the
state table to check the Passenger’s request for
additional conditions of established communication.
These requirements define different security levels:
potentially implementing all of them guarantees the high
security level. However, this influences the performance of
the system (Ahmed 2014).
4.2.5 Application of SRP5
Identify pattern In principle, this pattern focuses on the
data access to and from the database, or any other data
storage. The pattern occurrences are found when data are
loaded to (i.e., Store passenger information), and read
from (i.e., Issue boarding pass) the database (i.e.,
Data store).
Extract security model To define the security model as
in Fig. 10, it is necessary to determine the secure resources,
i.e., Datastore, operations, i.e.,
Store passenger information and Issue boarding pass,
and secured attribute, i.e., Passenger info, which value is
changed, or used when executing these operations.3 We
also assume that there is a role, i.e., Passenger, which has
an interest to observe ‘‘surrounding’’ events or tasks, such
as Check in information received, or
Send boarding pass) to load or to read the value of the
attribute. A Passenger permission should be defined that
describes what secure actions are allowed to be carried out
on the resource.
Derive security requirements We describe a ‘‘generic’’
security requirement following the security model:
– M1:Req5a:1: monitor the Datastore at
Check in server for malicious changes.
This pattern infers that security constraints of the access
control policy need to be established: these constraints are:
Fig. 10 SRP5: extracted security model
Fig. 9 SRP4: extracted security model (network architecture model adapted from Schumacher et al. 2005)
3 In comparison to SRP1, which defines permissions to execute
system activities (i.e., functions, operations), the SRP5 pattern takes
into account permissions and access control constraints defined
regarding the access of the data storage (e.g., database and its separate
tables). Such a security model defines the access policy and
contributes to the monitoring controls for the data access.
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– M1:Req5a:1:1: only Passenger should enter (i.e.,
create new entry) passenger info to Datastore by
executing operation storePassengerInformation.
– M1:Req5a:1:2: passenger info is read only by oper-
ation Issue boarding pass to issue the boarding pass
to the Passenger.
In addition to the access control policy, we strengthen the
security level by introducing the use of encryption algo-
rithms. This implements the security requirement:
– M1:Req5b:1: Check in server should make passen-
ger info invisible before storing it in the Data store.
Figure 11 summarizes the discussion by illustrating how
security requirements are introduced into the Passenger
check-in process. Note however that alternative process
designs are possible. In the next stage we asks for the
rationale why these security requirements are needed in
accordance with Sect. 4.3. Additionally, a trade-off anal-
ysis must be performed in order to determine, which
security requirements should be implemented in the system
or which security risks should be mitigated first.
4.3 Rationale for Security Requirements
In this section we consider the third research question:
– RQ3: What are the related security risks?
This question is not a direct target of the SREBP applica-
tion. Still, for those interested in why the security coun-
termeasures are introduced, i.e., security requirements and
controls, the security models resulting from the SRP
application and representing the security risks are pre-
sented to motivate the derived security countermeasures.
We discuss the security risks resulting from the SRP2
application in detail and summarize other security risks
identified using patterns SRP3, SRP4, and SRP5 on the
Passenger check-in process.
Figure 12 illustrates security risk RiskID1 that is
explicit if the security risk model is defined following
SRP2. Here, integrity of the Passenger info is considered
assuming that the Passenger info is sent via a
Transmission channel. Consequently, an Attacker exists
who is able to intercept this Transmission channel in
accordance with vulnerability [V] – thus,
Transmission can be intercepted, resulting in the man in
the middle attack. The Attacker is able to modify pas-
senger information and pass it on to Check in server.
This attack results in a negation of the integrity of the
Passenger info in accordance with the open lock. At the
Check in server, the integrity of the receiving passenger
info is not checked, which results in storing the changed
Passenger info in the Data store.
In Fig. 13 security risk RiskID2 is illustrated. SRP2 is
applied regarding the Boarding pass confidentiality.
Again, the Transmission channel can be intercepted due
to the same vulnerability, while this time, the Attacker
reads and keeps the boarding pass (see,
Read and keepboarding pass). This results in the nega-
tion of the boarding pass integrity. By acting as the man in
the middle, the Attacker is able to change the
Passenger info, e.g., by inserting his own name, and steal
the Boarding pass in order to access the plane.
Other security risks that are potentially identified using
SRP3, SRP4, and SRP5 are:
– RiskID3: an Attacker capable of writing malicious
scripts, e.g., SQL injection, xPath injection, etc.,
submits malicious scripts due to the lack of the input
filtering at the Check in server, thus resulting in the
loss of the integrity of the Passenger info and
potentially the integrity of the Issue board pass service.
The risk results from applying SRP3.
– RiskID4: an Attacker performs many simultaneous
requests to the Check in server making it not
available to the Passenger, thus resulting in a loss
of availability of the Issue board pass service. The
risk results from applying SRP4.
– RiskID5: a (malicious) insider modifies the
Passengerinfo by using the access control rights due
to poor data integrity checks, thus leading to the loss of
Passenger info integrity and possibly a loss of
integrity or availability of the Issue board pass. The
risk results from applying SRP5.
4.4 Security Requirements from Other Turnaround
Processes
The SREBP approach was used to derive security
requirements from other turnaround processed – baggage
check-in (secured assets – Baggage info and Bag tags),
Fuel service form issuing (secured assets –
Fuel quantityinfo and Fuel service form), Fuel service
form requesting (secured assets –
Fuel service form request and Fuel service form), and
Loading instruction form requesting.
Table 2 (secured assets – Loading instruction form request
and Loading instruction form) summarizes the number of
requirements elicited using the SRPs. The largest number of
requirements we derive from the Fuel service form requesting
process. Other analysis of the processes results in the same
number of requirements. We elicit 34 security requirements
using the SRP2 pattern and only 2 requirements are derived
using the SRP1 pattern.
Once security requirements are derived, it is important
which requirements need to be implemented. The next
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activities are requirements prioritisation and security trade-
off analysis, which helps determining important security
countermeasures. The implementation of the security
controls in the process will certainly result in constraints to
the system performance and efficiency. This analysis,
however, remains outside the scope of this study.
5 Limitation and Discussion
In this paper, we employ a case study to understand
security issues resulting from the collaboration between
airlines and service providers. We identify relevant assets
by modeling the business processes of an airline-turn-
around process. We find these assets in the passenger
management process and ground operations. The research
result is a security requirement and control framework. The
risk analysis is supported by theoretical methods from the
domain of security risk management.
Fig. 12 Capturing potential
security risks to the Passenger
info asset
Fig. 13 Capturing potential security risk to the Boarding pass asset
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5.1 Study Limitation
Our analysis comprises a certain degree of subjectivity.
Throughout the validation process, we only consulted one
expert. Although we trust the received feedback, opinions
by nature are subjective, and a collection of opinions also
from other experts would be preferable.
Another limitation is that the SREBP approach is
applied only to five business processes. Although the pro-
cesses are based on real life scenarios, we require a larger
number of process models. An interesting direction of
research would be to consider business processes from
other industries besides aviation to investigate how well the
SREBP conform in different domains.
Finally, the SREBP approach is used only by one of its
authors. Other researchers may have different observations
of the business asset identification, security needs deter-
mination, requirements security patterns’ applicability, and
security trade-off analysis. Therefore, to potentially miti-
gate this risk, we would welcome feedback from practi-
tioners and laymen who are unfamiliar with the approach
and its application to business processes.
5.2 Discussion
The following observations result from the application of
security risk oriented patterns:
– The expert’s feedback to the secured business processes
is approving. Revised airline turnaround models (see
step 2 in Sect. 3) and security requirements (see step 5)
are approved as relevant and important by the expert.
This also indicates that the used SREBP is a foundation
for the future development of a security catalog
pertaining to distributed systems.
– The extent of SRP application differs for various
patterns. This observation results from the number of
derived requirements. As discussed in Sect. 4, only two
security requirements are derived using SRP1, i.e.,
access to data within the system. Additionally, 34
requirements out of 59 result completely from using
SRP2, i.e., data transmission. This we explain by with
the nature of the domain, i.e., we have considered a
distributed system where communication plays an
important role.
– Not every SRP is applicable for distributed systems. For
instance, in Samarütel (2016) the SREBP approach is
extended by several SRPs for protecting against
deadlock attacks, for securing against brute force
attacks, for securing against account lockout attacks,
and so on. Although the listed SRPs are relevant in the
business process models where such security risks are
possible to capture, this is not the case in airline-
turnaround processes. Consequently, SRP application
depends significantly on the modeling domain and the
level of model granularity.
– The sequence of security requirements in a business
process does not limit the choice between security
controls. The sequence of security requirements may
vary in real-life business process models. When
arranging the sequence of the security requirements in
the business process models, we rely on a logical
viewpoint. For example, in the fuel service form issuing
process, we introduce that the server verifies the
integrity of fuel quantity information before readability
access. In reality, the implementation chosen to satisfy
these requirements performs message encryption and
an authentication in a reverse order. Thus, it is
necessary to assure that implementers depict the
business process, security requirements, and their
sequence in a business process not necessarily as the
end result.
One possible way to deal with the latter issue is the security
trade-off analysis with the goal to highlight the severe risks
and their countermeasures.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
We examined the applicability of the security requirements
elicitation from business processes in five business-process
models originating from airline-turnaround processes. The
business processes we enhanced with security requirements
using the security risk aware BNPMN modeling language.
We submitted the secured business processes for review to
Table 2 Number of security
requirements elicited from the
turnaround processes using
SRPs
Processes SRP1 SRP2 SRP3 SRP4 SRP5 Total
Passenger check-in process – 6 2 1 2 11
Baggage check-in process – 6 2 1 2 11
Fuel service form issuing – 10 1 1 3 15
Fuel service form requesting 1 6 1 1 2 11
Loading instruction form requesting 1 6 1 1 2 11
Total 2 34 7 5 11 59
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an expert who has experience with business processes used
in the airline industry.
The case study confirms the application feasibility of the
chosen approach. The study shows that there are many
security issues that exist in the airline industry. Specifically
problematic is that this industry segment is affected by ICT
innovation at a speed where decision makers do no longer
understand the evolving virtual enterprises that match their
processes cross-organizationally, and are suddenly con-
fronted with potentially catastrophic socio-technical secu-
rity issues.
The implication of our results is that companies that
operate in the airline industry must rapidly develop busi-
ness-process awareness as a prerequisite for automation.
The subsequent challenge for achieving progress in terms
of operational effectiveness and efficiency is to cross-or-
ganizationally match in-house processes. While the domi-
nant perspective explored is in this case is control flow,
security issues also arise from the perspectives of data flow,
resource management, exception and compensation man-
agement, and so on.
The limitation of this paper is that we can only report in
this case study paper on a small set of the SRP applications
for one case. Consequently, in future work we aim to
expand on the study by exploring the applicability of other
SREBP patterns. More specifically, we aim to study pat-
terns that can not be applied in this airline-turnaround case
study.
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eContractual choreography-language properties towards cross-
organizational business collaboration. J Int Serv Appl 6(1):1–23
Rodriguez A, Fernandez-Medina E, Piattini M (2007) A BPMN
extension for the modeling of security requirements in business
processes. IEICE Trans Inf Syst 90(4):745–752
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